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1. INTRODUCTION
Textiles and apparel currently represent the principal
United States import from the Caribbean Basin.' Despite an
overall decline in imports from the region since 1984, the value
of textile and apparel imports from Caribbean nations has
more than doubled since 1985. In 1990, textile and apparel
imports constituted 26.7 percent of all U.S. imports from the
region.' United States textile and apparel imports from the
Caribbean Basin increased 14.4 percent from 1989, reaching
$2.0 billion in 1990.' Demand for Caribbean textile and
apparel products continues to grow owing to proximity, low
production costs and market access advantages over other
suppliers.4
The development of the Caribbean Basin's apparel and
textile industries has been intricately connected with United
States regional trade policy. United States interests in the
region are substantial. The Caribbean Basin is the third
border of the United States, the second largest source of illegal
immigration, and a vital sea passage through which much of
the nation's oil imports travel. Since the 1980s the United
States has pursued regional economic development as a means
of protecting its own interests and advancing the economic
progress of the region's nations.5
A renewed focus on United States trade policy in the
Caribbean Basin is important at this time due to changes
presently occurring in world trading patterns. Despite years
"J.D. Candidate, 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B.,
1989, Harvard College.
1 2322 U.S.I.T.C. ANN. REP. ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS 2-7 (1991).
2 1&
3 Id. at 2-9.
4Id.
' Thomas L. Raleigh III, The US Caribbean Basin Initiative, 15 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 136, 136 (1987).
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of effort, a lag in the industrial development of the Caribbean
Basin and other less developed nations persists. New trading
blocs are emerging in the Pacific Rim and as a result of the
pending unification of the European Community. Further-
more, both the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the opening of
Eastern Europe are likely to create trade opportunities that
could distract investors and policy-makers from the trade
problems of the Caribbean.
This Comment discusses recent developments in the United
States textile and apparel trade policy in the Caribbean and
offers assessments of the potential impact on industries
located in the Caribbean Basin. The first section describes the
Caribbean Basin Initiative' and the trade regime under which
the region's apparel and textile industries have developed.
The second section outlines the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative,' recently announced by President Bush, which
contemplates a hemisphere-wide free trade zone and the
creation of a North-South trading bloc.
World textile and apparel trade is currently governed by
the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (the "MFA")8 and a web of
bilateral trade agreements, which restrict free trade in textiles
and apparel. These trade agreements constitute a significant
departure from the general principles of free trade outlined
under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT").'
Proposals to eliminate the MFA are the most important recent
development in international textile.
Textile negotiators at the presently stalled Uruguay Round
negotiations on the renewal of GATT have focused on propos-
als to reintegrate the MFA into GATT by phasing out world-
' Caribbean Basin Initiative, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983).
7 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESS RELEASE, TEXT
OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
ADDRESS (June 27, 1990).
' Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973,
25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840 (hereinafter "MFA"); extended Dec. 14,
1977,29 U.S.T. 2287, T.I.A.S. 8939 (hereinafter "MFA II"); extended Dec. 22,
1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10,323 (hereinafter "MFA III"); extended July 31, 1986,
GATT Doe. COM.TEXIW/183 (hereinafter "MFA IV").
' Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A 2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
308.
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wide restrictions on trade in textiles and apparel. 0 The
phaseout of these restrictions will change the current legal
structure of international textile trade. The mechanism of the
phaseout, as well as its ultimate terms, has the potential to
protect, to harm, or even to destroy the textile and apparel
operations which currently exist in the Caribbean Basin.
These concerns are addressed in the third section of the
Comment.
The Comment concludes that apparel and textile industries
in the Caribbean Basin will continue to develop as they have
in the past. However, ongoing free trade negotiations and the
pending phaseout of the MFA are likely to increase competi-
tion in apparel trade and could adversely affect the Caribbean
Basin's competitive position. The long-term future of the
industry remains uncertain, pending the determination of the
duration and exact mechanism that will govern the phaseout
of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement.
2. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
2.1. The Initiative
President Reagan announced a United States proposal for
a "Caribbean Basin Initiative" in February, 1982." Calling
the Initiative "an economic program that integrates trade, aid
and investment," the President proposed "a long-term commit-
ment to countries of the Caribbean and Central America." 2
Congress enacted the trade aspects of the President's proposal
in the "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act" (the
" See, e.g. Statement by the United States Delegation at the Meeting of
the Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing, 21 Sep. 1989, MTN.6N6/
N641W/26.
" President Reagan's Address to Organization of American States, Feb.
24, 1982, Announcing Caribbean Basin Initiative, and Excerpts of White
House Fact Sheet on Initiative, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 397, at 609
(March 2, 1982) [hereinafter "CBI Announcement Speech"].
" CBI Announcement Speech, supra note 11, at 611. The President's
specific proposals included (1) free trade for Caribbean Basin products
exported to the U.S., with the exception of textile and apparel products
covered under other agreements; (2) tax incentives to promote investment
and bilateral investment treaties; (3) increased concessional aid up to $350
million; (4) technical assistance and training to promote private sector, local
enterprise; (5) encouragement of other nations to increase aid; and (6)
measures to benefit Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Id.
19921
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"CBERA" or "Caribbean Basin Initiative" or "CBr') on August
5, 1983."3 The Caribbean Basin Initiative arose out of the
United States' interest in promoting development and increas-
ing the stability of small, developing and newly independent
nations. As early as 1981, massive illegal immigration from
the Caribbean, perceived Communist infiltration in the region,
and the impact of escalating oil costs on fragile Caribbean
economies led the United States to consider strategies for
protecting U.S. interests in its "backyard" by promoting stable
economies in the region. 4
In general, an importer's primary means of controlling the
flow of goods into its markets are tariffs and quotas. Whereas
quotas control trade flows by setting quantitative limits on the
amount of a product that may be imported, tariffs limit
imports by placing a duty on imported goods, increasing their
costs and reducing their ability to compete in the marketplace.
In general, high tariffs and low quotas on a product discourage
free trade. Additionally, the impact of a reduced tariff might
be nullified by a corresponding decrease in quota allowances,
and conversely the impact of more generous quotas might be
nullified by increased tariffs. In the United States, quotas on
textiles and apparel products are established through bilateral
agreements negotiated between trading partners under the
MFA. Tariffs are established by Congress and implemented
through the Harmonized Tariff Schedule.' 5
The CBERA created an executive power to eliminate tariffs
on certain products imported from Caribbean nations" and
,3 Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983).
14 Raleigh, supra note 5. See generally CBI Announcement Speech, supra
note 11.
'5 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
1" For the purposes of this paper, the "Caribbean Basin" is defined to
include the following countries which are designated beneficiaries under
CBERA as of January 1, 1991: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua,
Panama, Saint Christopher-Nevis (St. Kitts), Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. U.S.I.T.C. ANN. REP. supra note
1, at 1-2.
The President has the discretion to designate eligible countries that
have met the criteria of economic and/or investment reforms required under
the Act. These criteria include non-Communist government; no expropria-
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designated by the legislation." Through tariff reduction, the
CBERA sought to promote the economic development of the
Caribbean region by encouraging manufacturing and increas-
ing exports.'" The CBERA program tariff reductions were to
remain in effect until 1995.
Products were specifically exempted from the CBERA's
coverage in areas where an industry of the United States
required special protection.' The most significant exempted
area was trade in textile products. As a result of this exemp-
tion, trade in textiles and apparel continued to be governed by
bilateral agreements negotiated under the MFA.
2.2. Sections 807 and 807A of the United States Tariff Code
Although trade in textiles and apparel was not covered by
CBERA, a large number of apparel imports from the Caribbe-
an were already receiving the benefits of lower duties allowed
under Section 8070 of the U.S. Tariff Code. Section 807,
tion of U.S. property, cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement efforts,
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, recognition of worker
collective bargaining rights; and the establishment of self-help measures.
Raleigh, supra note 5, at 137(3).
n Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983).
The CBERA contains strict rules of origin to insure that gains from
trade benefit Caribbean exporters. These rules require a minimum of 20
percent local content, direct importation into the United States, and
substantial transformation of a product prior to its importation. These rules
are designed to prevent "pass-through" operations which, in effect, transfer
the preferential treatment aimed at CBI beneficiaries to other suppliers.
In the Caribbean Basin textile trade, pass-through operations are most
likely to be established by large exporters from the Far East-Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Taiwan-known as the "Big Three", whose textile trade
is subject to large restrictions. These exporters would establish operations
in the Caribbean to gain increased or more preferential access to the United
States market than their quota or tariff structure allows. Rules of origin
attempt to limit this circumvention of tariffs or quotas by requiring a
substantial transformation of products prior to their exportation. Pass-
through operations are generally disliked by domestic manufacturers, but
are likely to be promoted by Caribbean nations to the limits allowed under
the rules of origin.
" Limits were also placed on imports of sugar and other perishable
products. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(5). Safeguard measures were created to allow
restoration of tariffs on products covered by CBERA upon a showing that
imports were a substantial cause of serious injury or a threat to domestic
industries. Id.
"' Harmonized Tariff Schedule § 9802, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1978 & Supp.
1991).
1992]
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which is not limited to textiles or to any particular nation or
group of nations, relieves manufacturers of duty payable on
the value of goods assembled overseas from parts manufac-
tured in the United States when those goods are reimported
into the United States as finished products."'
In a typical Section 807 apparel operation, fabric is cut by
American workers in domestic manufacturing facilities, and is
then shipped to Caribbean nations where the fabric pieces are
assembled in facilities that are owned by either American or
foreign concerns. The finished products are then shipped back
into the United States, with duty paid only on the value added
in the CBERA assembling nation.
Apparel assembly in the Caribbean Basin has been the
primary beneficiary of Section 807.22 Greater restrictions on
trade and increased costs of textile and apparel imports from
traditional Far Eastern sources have contributed to this
growth."3 In 1990, the value of textile and apparel imports
on a customs value basis from CBERA beneficiaries were
nearly two-and-one-half times their comparable value in
1986.24 The proximity of the Caribbean Basin to the United
States and the Section 807 tariff advantage have increased the
Caribbean Basin's share of total United States textile and
apparel imports from three percent to six percent between
1986 and 1990.25 Textiles and apparel now represent the
principal United States import from CBERA-designated
countries.28
Caribbean apparel export operations have grown in
response to increased investment from the United States and
from the Far East. However, due to the predominance of
" Under this provision, "an article which has been assembled abroad is
subject to duty on the freight and insurance that is paid to get the
components and supplies from the U.S. port of exportation to the factory
door plus the cost of labor in that foreign country. To this will be added the
cost of any assists (such as a sewing machine which is given to the factory
free of charge)." Norman E. Gelber, Deciphering the CBI and Tariff
Nomenclature, BOBBIN, July 1989, at 20.
22 p. STEELE, THE CARIBBEAN CLOTHING INDUSTRY 49 (1988).
23 STEELE, supra note 22, at 2.
24 U.S.I.T.C. ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 2-9.
26 id
261 Id. Apparel imports predominate over textiles, which include yarns
and fabrics.
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United States investment, the industry's development has
been patterned largely upon the requirements of the United
States market and the Section 807 program, with apparel
assembly operations predominating over weaving and other
textile manufacturing. 7 Furthermore, Caribbean exporters
remain heavily dependent on the United States market, having
failed to develop significant relationships with other trading
partners. Therefore, the viability of the Caribbean Basin
textile and apparel industry continues to depend heavily on
United States regional trade policy, and in particular, on
provisions that affect apparel assembly operations."
In the early 1980s, domestic apparel manufacturers began
to show an increased interest in Section 807 operations to
reduce labor costs and increase their competitiveness.
Domestic producers also showed increased concern over the
activities of Far Eastern investors in the Caribbean Basin."
Although many existing apparel assembly operations were
already benefitting from the lower tariffs under Section 807,
domestic manufacturers and Caribbean Basin operators began
to pressure for an expansion of the CBERA "no-duty" provi-
sions to Section 807 and non-Section 807 apparel imports.30
Instead of reducing or eliminating existing tariffs, Presi-
dent Reagan announced in February 1986 a "Special Access
Program" to increase quota allowances on restricted textile
and apparel imports from the Caribbean Basin." Under the
program, textile and apparel products assembled in CBERA
beneficiary countries from goods cut in the United States from
27 STEELE, supra note 22, at 1.
2 Id. at 2.
"' Id. at 53-55.
" Id. See also Joyce E. Santora, USAIC Addresses Real-World 807,
BOBBIN, May 1989, at 98-100. The Apparel Industry Council, representing
domestic apparel manufacturers, was successful in lobbying for the inclusion
of a short-supply provision in CBI II legislation, and has continued to play
an active role as an advisor on legislative issues that affect'the industry.
S' Raleigh, supra note 5, at 138. Although the Special Access Program
was not implemented under the CBERA, the legislative history of the Act
indicates that in lieu of duty-free treatment for textiles, provisions were to
be made to grant more liberal access levels for textile and apparel exports
of CBERA beneficiaries. See Brenda A. Jacobs, New CBI Legislation
Proposes Duty-Free GALs, BOBBIN, May 1989, at 26.
1992]
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domestically produced fabric32 receive effectively unlimited
access to the U.S. market.3
Under the "Special Access Program," also known as
"Section 807A," countries may obtain, through bilateral
agreements, guaranteed access levels ("GALs") for eligible
products in excess of levels negotiated or allowed under the
MFA. GALs are established solely on the basis of the
exporter's capacity to produce, and may be increased upon
request, effectively creating unlimited access to the United
States market for conforming goods.3 4 In exchange, the
United States has indicated its intention to impose tighter
restrictions on other categories of goods, and to make in-
creased use of the safeguard mechanisms available under the
MFA. 35
With the exception of some customs bureaucracy, Sections
807 and 807A have accomplished many of their goals. The
development of outward processing operations has expanded
both the manufacture and the assembly of apparel in the
Caribbean. Textile and apparel exports to the United States
from the region totaled $1.73 billion in 1989.36 Unlimited
access under Section 807A, reduced tariffs under Section 807
and access and cost advantages over Far Eastern suppliers
have enabled the Caribbean to carve out a protected niche
exporting apparel to the United States. The continuation of
these advantages is important to the continued growth and
security of regional apparel industries.3
Sections 807 and 807A have also benefitted producers in
the United States. Combined with continued restrictions on
8" Harmonized Tariff Schedule § 9802, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1978 & Supp.
1991). Under Section 807, goods cut from imported fabric are eligible for
duty reductions. However, to be eligible under the "Special Access
Program," the fabric must be domestically produced. Id. This provision
reflects the domestic weaving industry's concern over the use of imported
fabric.
8 STEELE, supra note 22, at 56.
341d.
3Id. These provisions are directed at preventing pass-through
operations of Far Eastern suppliers located in the Caribbean. See supra
note 18.
86 Ken I. Boodhoo, The Caribbean, BOBBIN, November 1990, at 54.
37 See Id at 64. See also STEELE, supra note 22, at 4.
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Big Three import levels, 8 domestic manufacturers have
benefitted from low cost labor supplied by Caribbean workers
that has enabled them to remain competitive with other world
suppliers."9 Apparel reimported under Sections 807 and
807A has largely been made from domestically produced fabric.
Furthermore, the development of the Caribbean textile
industry has developed in a highly specialized manner, where
apparel-assembly operations predominate, thus protecting
other operations of domestic manufacturers, such as weaving,
from new competition.4
2.3. Recent Developments: The CBI H Legislation
The CBERA was recently extended by Congress in the
Customs and Trade Act of 1990,41 but without several propos-
als which were designed to expand its coverage. As introduced
by Representative Sam Gibbons, the Caribbean Basin Econom-
ic Recovery Act of 1989 ("CBI II"),42 proposed several changes
to the existing CBI program. The most significant of these
proposals included: (a) the extension of duty-free treatment to
textile and apparel products entering the United States under
Section 807 and 807A; (b) the codification of the "Special
Access Program"; (c) a "short-supply" provision for the duty-
free entry of 807 and 807A products assembled from foreign
fabric that is cut in the United States when that fabric is
determined to be a type not formed in the United States or
where the fabric, although formed in the United States is in
critical shortage; and (d) phrasing to deal with domestic
concern over pass-through operations and quota allocations by
38 Protectionist sentiment in Congress is evidenced by the passage of the
Textile, Apparel and Footwear Trade Act of 1990, which was recently vetoed
by President Bush. The act contained provisions which would have imposed
sharper restrictions on the imports of clothes, textiles and shoes. Peter
Passell, Apparel Makers' Last Stand?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at D2.
" Products sourced most effectively in the Caribbean as opposed to the
Far East, generally require a substantial amount of workmanship andlabor.
Low cost labor in the Caribbean and reduced duties under 807 and 807A
give the region a competitive, edge. Manuel Gaetan, Going for the Gold in
807/CBI, BOBBIN, June 1988, at 88-90.
40 STEELE, supra note 22, at 4.
41 Customs and Trade Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. § 2701-06 (Supp. 1991).
42 H.R. 1233, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
1992]
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Caribbean nations to East Asian operations in the Caribbe-
an.
43
As enacted, the CBI II legislation repealed the 1995
termination date of the 1983 CBERA and extended its
operation indefinitely." However, due to pressure from
apparel unions and domestic producers, the legislation as
,passed failed to extend duty-free treatment to textile and
apparel products, failed to codify the GAL program, and
contained no short-supply provision. Although duty on textiles
and apparel imported under Sections 807 and 807A is already
low, the exemption of these products from duty would most
likely have increased participation in the programs. A short-
supply provision would have expanded the range of fabrics
available for use in CBI operations.
One provision of CBI II as passed could increase invest-
ment in the Caribbean textile and apparel industry. Section
227 requires that the Puerto Rican government invest at least
$100,000,000 annually in new projects in CBI countries.45
Since 1987, a "complementary plants" program created under
Section 936 of the Internal Revenue code has provided low cost
capital financing for the construction of new manufacturing
operations in CBI beneficiary countries.4" This program has
led to increased investment in Section 807 operations in CBI
countries.47
Although CBI II failed to expand duty-free access and
failed to codify Section 807A, the Caribbean Basin is likely to
continue to enjoy the trade advantages which have encouraged
the growth of a prosperous and important apparel assembly
industry, and to a lesser extent, a textile industry. Apparel
exporters based in the region enjoy unlimited access to the
United States with regard to products assembled from United
States fabric under Section 807A, lower tariffs on Section 807
exports, and additional cost and access factors that enable the
region to compete effectively in the world market. These
advantages, in an international trade environment governed
by restrictions on free trade under the MFA, have enabled the
4 Id. See also Jacobs, supra note 31, at 28-32.
44 19 U.S.C. § 2701-06 (Supp. 1991).
41 Customs and Trade Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (Supp. 1991).
46 I.R.C. § 936 (West 1987).
47 STEELE, supra note 22, at 3.
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Caribbean Basin apparel assembly and textile industries to
become the region's primary exporters.
3. THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
3.1. A Vision of Free Trade
The growth of the Caribbean Basin industry has largely
been based on Section 807's preferential tariff treatment and
Section 807A's guaranteed access levels. The operation of
these programs has created the advantages that are now
enjoyed by regional apparel operators and that continue to
spur investment in the region.48 Yet the dependence of the
Caribbean apparel industry on preferential treatment and
United States policy leaves the region exposed to risks if those
policies change.
One source of that change may emerge from the "Enter-
prise for the Americas" initiative (the "ETA") announced by
President Bush on June 27, 1990."" The ETA proposed a new
economic partnership between the United States and the
nations of the Western hemisphere to build upon "a rising tide
of democracy" and recent free market economic reforms "never
before witnessed in the history of this hemisphere."' °
Calling for "trade-not aid,"5 the ETA proposed three
strategies to increase intra-hemispheric trade and promote
economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean: (1)
investment, (2) debt reduction and (3) trade.52 In the area of
48 U.S.I.T.C. ANN. REP., supra note 1, at v. (Significant investment in
apparel assembly operations in CBERA beneficiaries was reported in 1989.)
49 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESS RELEASE, TEXT
OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
ADDRESS (June 27, 1990).
50Id. at 1.
51 Id
5 Id. at 2-3. The President also proposed a strengthening of environ-
mental policies in the hemisphere, including debt-for-nature swaps and the
creation of environmental trusts, which would hold debt interest payments
in local currency and divert interest earned on those funds to environmental
projects. Id.
The trade provisions of the ETA are of primary interest for the purpose
of this Comment; however, the investment and debt provisions of the ETA
are described briefly below. To increase investment, the United States
would create new lending programs to benefit countries that make
investment reforms and would streamline bureaucracies that reduce
1992]
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trade, the ETA proposed a hemisphere-wide free trade zone
"stretching from the port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego.""3
In addition, the ETA proposed closer cooperation with Latin
American and Caribbean nations in the Uruguay Round
negotiations on free trade, including added pressure for deeper
tariff cuts on strategic products and stronger trade rules."
Products of special interest to the nation's hemispheric trade
partners would be identified in order to cut tariffs on these
products without waiting for countries to make formal
requests.5 5
As a step toward the hemisphere-wide free trade zone, the
President proposed the formation of free trade agreements
with nations or regional trade associations in South America
and the Caribbean. These agreements, to govern trade in
goods, services, investments, and intellectual property, would
establish new rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution.5"
In addition, the agreements would open discussion on the
enhancement of free trade and the integration of Latin
America and the Caribbean economies into the world economy
barriers to foreign investment. In addition, an investment fund, funded by
the United States, Japan and Europe, would make up to $300 million yearly
in grants to countries undertaking privatization and market reforms. These
programs would be administered by the Inter-American Development Bank
("IDBn), in coordination with the World Bank.
The IDB would also play a role in efforts to reduce Latin American and
Caribbean debt. The IDB, working with the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, would support the reduction of commercial debt in
countries embarking on economic reform. In addition, the Department of the
Treasury would work on a case-by-case basis to reduce the $12 billion in
official debt owed by Latin American and Caribbean Basin nations to the
United States. Department of the Treasury Statement by the Honorable
David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs,
Before the Subcommittees on the Western Hemisphere, Human Rights and
International Organizations, and International Economic Policy and Trade
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July 18, 1990,
at 2.
53l. at 2.
54Id. at 2.
6' Department of the Treasury Statement by the Honorable David C.
Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Before
the Subcommittees on the Western Hemisphere, Human Rights and
International Organizations, and International Economic Policy and Trade
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July 18, 1990,
at 2.
56 I-
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as part of a hemisphere-wide trading bloc as large as the
European Community. These agreements would achieve, in
the words of the President, "greater growth and a higher
standard of living in Latin America-and right here at home,
new markets for American products, and more jobs for
American workers.""
A potential effect of the ETA on the Caribbean Basin's
apparel assembly and textile industry could be the further
liberalization of Caribbean Basin exporters' access to the
United States and other regional markets through the
elimination of remaining quotas and tariffs on regional
exports.
However, the elimination of barriers for Caribbean
exporters would occur along with the elimination of similar
barriers for other exporters in the region and in South
America. Caribbean sources could then be faced with in-
creased competition in a new market without tariff or access
preferences. A multilateral arrangement such as that contem-
plated by the ETA could eliminate the preferential treatment
enjoyed by Caribbean apparel assemblers under current
bilateral agreements.5"
Although Caribbean Basin exporters have much to gain
from increased liberalization of the terms of trade, they have
much to lose if similar tariff decreases and quota increases are
passed on to other nations. The advantages enjoyed by the
Caribbean Basin in textile and apparel trade are the result of
exceptions to the current structure of textile trade. The
dismantling of that structure could potentially unsettle the
Caribbean Basin's exporting industries and the advantages
they currently enjoy over other international sources.
67 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESS RELEASE, TEXT
OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
ADDRESS (June 27, 1990), at 2.
r" The threat posed by multilateral agreements to preferential treatment
afforded to developing countries under bilateral agreements is an important
issue in current negotiations to integrate the MFA into GATT. Developing
countries generally argue that preferences are required to keep them on an
equal footing with more developed countries.
1992]
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3.2. The ETA's Accomplishments to Date
In September 1990, President Bush proposed the Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1990 (the "Enterprise
Act")5" to Congress. This bill largely reiterated the invest-
ment, debt reduction and environmental programs announced
by the President on June 27, 1990.
The bill contained six proposals for the implementation of
the Enterprise for the Americas initiative: (1) contributions
totalling $500 million over five years to an investment fund
managed by IDB, (2) an investment center lending program,
(3) a facility in the Treasury Department to implement debt
reduction, (4) the reduction of official and concessional debts
owed by eligible countries, (5) the use of interest payments on
official debt to support environmental programs and (6) the
sale, reduction or cancellation of United States loans to
facilitate debt-for-equity or debt-for-nature swaps.60
The bill also contained requirements for eligibility. Eligible
countries must have: (1) an International Monetary Fund
("IMF") agreement, (2) World Bank loans, (3) major investment
reforms in conjunction with an IDB loan or otherwise be
implementing open investment regimes, and (4) where
appropriate, a financing package with commercial banks
governing debt and debt service. 1
While the Senate version of the bill, S. 3064, replicates the
President's proposal, the House version 2 contains several
significant differences. The House bill would not appropriate
$500 million for the IDB investment fund, nor would it allow
U.S. loans to be sold, reduced or canceled in debt-for-equity or
debt-for nature swaps. The House bill also relaxes the strict
eligibility requirements of the Senate and Administration
versions, allowing participation by countries that make
significant progress toward meeting the requirements.
As of September 26, 1990, most Caribbean Basin nations
failed to meet the four eligibility criteria required under the
5 S. 3064, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
60 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESS RELEASE,
THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIvE ACT OF 1990 (1990). See
also S. 3064, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess (1990).
61 Id
82 H.R. 5855, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
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bill.6" The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago each fail on at least
one of the qualifying criteria."
Although the Enterprise Act remains stalled in Congress,
some progress on the trade aspects of the ETA has been made.
The United States has had some success in meeting the
Initiative's short-term goal of entering into bilateral trade
agreements with its trading partners in Latin America and the
Caribbean, most notably the ongoing discussions and negotia-
tions concerning a free trade agreement with Mexico. Canada
recently agreed to join in these negotiations."5
Bilateral discussions have been initiated with several
countries in South America and the Caribbean. On July 23,
1990, the United States Trade Representative (the "USTR")
announced agreements establishing a United States-Ecuador
Council on Trade and Investment and Joint Commission on
Trade and Investment with Colombia. On November 1, 1990,
the United States and Honduras entered into a similar
framework agreement establishing a United States-Honduran
Council on Trade and Investment.6 In addition, the United
States and Bolivia have made trade agreements.6" The
agreements all create a framework to monitor trade, promote
investment, identify opportunities for trade expansion and,
ultimately, to negotiate market opening agreements.
3.3. Prospects for the Future
Despite the ETA's lofty goal of achieving a hemisphere-
wide free trade zone, the proposal lacks specific recommenda-
tions to achieve this goal. Instead, the ETA is best understood
as a message of good intent from the United States, as well as
a tool to develop greater interest and participation by Caribbe-
" Internal Memorandum Caribbean Central-American Action (Sept. 25,
1990).
4Id
5 Christopher Marquis, U.S., Mexico, Canada Eye One Market, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 1991, at 8-C.
66 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, PRESS RELEASE, U.S. AND ECUADOR SIGN TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT AGREEMENT (Nov. 1, 1990).
"' OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESS
RELEASE (July 23, 1990).
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an and Latin American countries in the Uruguay Round
negotiations."8
The testimony of David Mulford, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, before Congressional
hearings on the Enterprise Act, reveals the close link between
the ETA and ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations: "The first
pillar of the initiative aims to expand trade. The successful
completion of the Uruguay Round remains the most effective
way of promoting long-term trade growth in Latin America and
-the Caribbean .... 9
While the ETA is represented as a new trade initiative, in
substance it merely continues past policies and negotiating
strategies. For example, David Mulford's announcement that
the United States would initiate tariff cuts without requests
from trade partners 0 merely adds another bargaining chip to
ongoing tariff negotiations. Although a list of products of
special interest was prepared by the USTR and sent to all
eligible countries, the inclusion of a product or classification on
this list merely opens the possibility for additional tariff
decreases during the normal negotiating process."'
With respect to the apparel and textile industries in the
Caribbean Basin, the ETA is likely to have little immediate
effect. In fact, it is unclear whether agreements negotiated
under the ETA will supersede other existing MFA agreements
in textile and apparel trade. The current ineligibility of many
Caribbean Basin nations also suggests that short-term gains
from the ETA may be small for the region.
However, free trade agreements with other countries have
the potential to affect Caribbean Basin exports adversely. For
example, a free trade agreement with Mexico could have an
impact on established apparel assemblers in the Caribbean,
such as Jamaica, that currently benefit under preferential
access agreements. If quotas and tariffs on textile and apparel
6' Telephone Interview with Ralph Ives, Office of the United States
Trade Representative (Nov. 23, 1990).
" Statement of the Honorable David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Int'l Affairs, Before the Subcommittee on the W. Hemisphere,
Hum. Rights and Int'l Organizations, and Int'l Econ. Pol'y and Trade
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, at 3
(September 27, 1990).
70 See supra note 55.
71 Telephone Interview with Ralph Ives, supra note 68.
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products were dropped on the United States-Mexico border,
inexpensive Mexican labor combined with unlimited access and
transportation linkages could draw investment away from the
Caribbean. Although the Mexico free trade agreement has
generated concern in Latin America and the Caribbean, its
passage is far from guaranteed due to domestic political
opposition. 2 However, Caribbean business and government
officials remain concerned about Caribbean wage competitive-
ness and the ability of Caribbean products to compete with
Mexican products in the United States market under the
ETA.
73
Despite its failure to add much substance to United States
hemispheric trade policy, the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative may have a positive impact in the long run by
promoting discussion of free trade and investment issues.
With much of the world's attention focused on the pending
unification of Europe, the rebuilding of the Eastern bloc and
the Soviet Union, and crises in the Middle East, the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative may promote increased consider-
ation of the problems of this hemisphere. Nine Latin Ameri-
can Presidents have announced that they are ready to speed
up integration of their economies in response to Bush's free
trade zone vision.7 4
In general, the future of the Caribbean region's apparel and
textile industry depends on United States textile trade policy,
which is not set solely on the basis of the "Enterprise for the
Americas" Initiative. Indeed, the future of textile and apparel
trade policy worldwide is intricately connected with the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement. The future of the MFA remains unclear
and depends ultimately on the outcome of current textile
negotiations currently underway as part of the Uruguay
Round. These negotiations and the changes proposed in the
MFA are considered in detail in the next section of the Comment.
"' Enterprise for Americas Plan Faces Challenge with Mexico, Reuters,
AM cycle, Sept. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Library
Report File.
7 3 U.S.I.T.C. ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 4-5.
7" Latin American Leaders Set to Speed up Economic Integration,
Reuters, BC cycle, Oct. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
Library Report File.
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4. PHASING OUT THE MFA:
URUGUAY ROUND DEVELOPMENTS
4.1. Introduction
The textile negotiating committee for the Uruguay
Round75 of multilateral negotiations concerning GATT has set
for itself an ambitious goal-the phaseout of the Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Textiles (the "Multi-Fiber
Arrangement" or "MFA"). 6 Since 1974, the MFA has provided
a framework for managing international trade in textiles and
apparel, primarily through individually negotiated bilateral
trade agreements and safeguard measures between trading
partners. Actions taken pursuant to the MFA by negotiating
parties have resulted in significant departures from GATT free
trade principles by authorizing trade processes that are
otherwise illegal under GATT.7 7 Under the operation of the
MFA, international trade in textiles and apparel, which
constitutes a significant portion of world trade,78 is entirely
exempted from GATT coverage.
The MFA is the outgrowth of post World War II textile
trade agreements: the Short Term Arrangement of 196179 and
the Long Term Arrangement of 1962, o both of which re-
7'Revisions of GATT occur in "Rounds" which consist of multilateral
negotiations between trading parties whose goal generally has included the
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. The Uruguay Round is the
eighth of these rounds, taking its name from the country in which talks
were first initiated, in this case, at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1987. See
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 53 (1989).
76 MFA, supra note 8.
77 HENRY R. ZHENG, LEGAL STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE
TRADE 12-13 (1988).
7'8 Note, United States Trade Policy in Textiles and Apparel: Does the
Multifiber Arrangement Have a Future?, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
541, 541 (1985). See also Bhagirath L. Das, The GATT Multi-Fibre
Arrangement, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 95 (1983).
7' Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, July
21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1675; T.I.A.S. No. 4884. See also ZHENG, supra note 77,
at 1-5.
"' Long-Term Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2673, T.I.A.S. No. 5240; extended by
Protocol on May 1, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S. No. 6284 and on June 15,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 1971; T.I.A.S. No. 6940. See also ZHENG, supra note 77, at
1-5.
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mained in effect through renewal until they were succeeded by
the MFA in 1974. These agreements, covering only product of
cotton fibers, allowed participating parties, in violation of
GATT, to impose quantitative restrictions on textile imports
that caused or threatened to cause market disruption in
domestic markets. In exchange, exporting countries received
assurances that quota levels would not be less than those of
prior years, and that quota levels would be guaranteed at least
a minimum annual increase."1 This basic structure was
continued with the MFA in 1974, which expanded coverage to
include synthetic fibers.82 The MFA has subsequently been
extended with alterations three times,"8 and the most recent
agreement (MFA IV) expired in June 1991.
Negotiations concerning the MFA and textile trade during
the current Uruguay Round have focused on the creation of a
satisfactory transition mechanism to phase out the MFA and
integrate trade in textiles and apparel into GATT." Unfortu-
nately, negotiations were suspended in December 1990 due to
disagreements between the United States and the European
Community over agricultural policy85 before any satisfactory
81 See ZHENG, supra note 77, at 1-5.
a The coverage of the MFA includes:
tops, yarns, piece-goods, made-up articles, garments, and other
textile manufactured products (being products which derive their
chief characteristics from their textile components) of cotton, wool,
man-made fibers, or blends thereof, in which any or all of those
fibers in combination represent either the chief value of the fibers
or 50 percent or more by weight, (or 17 percent or more by weight
of wool) of the product.
MFA, supra note 8, art. 12, para. 1. MFA IV expanded this coverage to
include vegetable fiber blends and silk blend products. MFA IV, supra note
8, para. 24.
88 See supra note 8. Textile and apparel trade is currently governed by
the MFA and modifications to that agreement under MFA IV. A discussion
of the changes and alterations negotiated since MFA I is beyond the scope
of this Comment. Accordingly, all citations to the MFA, unless otherwise
noted, refer to MFA I. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the
MFA, see ZHENG, supra note 77.
34 See e.g. Statement by the United States Delegation at the Meeting of
the Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing, 21 Sep. 1989, MTN.6N6/
N64/W/26.
36 Stuart Auerbach, Trade Talks Again Stalled Over Subsidies; Hopes
Seen Fading for Successful Outcome, WASH. PoST, Dec. 7, 1990, at C12. See
also Maria L. LaGanga, Breakdown of the Trade Talks; How U.S. Industries
View the GAT Results, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1990, at D1.
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agreement could be reached.
Both the terms and timing of the MFA phaseout hold
significant implications for the future of the Caribbean Basin
apparel assembly industries. The transition to GATT has the
potential to disrupt and alter the trade advantages that
Caribbean apparel exporters currently enjoy over other
international apparel sources.
The effects of a MFA phaseout, and the consequent
elimination of preferential access levels, could have devastat-
ing effects on the Caribbean producers. Along with reduced
tariffs available under Section 807, preferential access to the
U.S. market has helped sustain growth of Section 807 apparel
assembly operations in the Caribbean Basin. Although an
MFA phaseout would not necessarily require the United States
to abandon its Section 807 provision, the Section 807A quota
advantages would be eliminated as countries were given equal
access under the non-discrimination principles of GATT.
Caribbean nations are therefore concerned that provisions for
the continued operation of Sections 807 and 807A be made
explicit in any MFA phaseout mechanism in order to preserve
the outward processing trade of many Caribbean Basin
nations.8 Indeed, many Caribbean nations have taken the
stance that growth in the apparel sector could not be sustained
if bilateral quotas and the MFA system were abruptly disman-
tled. 7
4.2. The MFA and GATT: Reconciling their Differences
4.2.1. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement
The operation of the MFA avoids the GATT prohibition on
quantitative restrictions and discriminatory treatment by
allowing the imposition of quotas based on individual negotia-
tions and agreements with trading partners. The MFA reflects
a compromise between the interests of importing and exporting
countries in managing trade in textiles and apparel. Upon
" See e.g. Transcript of Meeting between Ambassador Ron Sorini, U.S.
Chief Textile Negotiator and C.B.I. Delegates (Apr. 24, 1990) (transcript
available from the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Business Law).
"7Discussions at a Meeting of CBI Apparel Group, SUMMARY REPORT,
(CBI Apparel Group, New York, N.Y.), June 23, 1990, at 2.
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establishment of market disruption, "importing countries may
deviate from the GATT norms by resorting to discriminatory
quantitative restrictions on textile imports; in exchange,
exporting countries are entitled to the orderly development of
textile trade on a quantifiably defined basis."88
Annex A of the MFA outlines the factors that constitute a
market disruption. To establish market disruption, an
importing country must believe that certain imports from a
particular exporting nation have caused, or threaten to cause,
serious damage to the domestic industry. This belief must be
based on evidence of actual damage to the domestic industry
market share, profits or employment; a sharp and substantial
increase or threatened, imminent increase of imports; and a
price differential between imports and domestic products.8 9
In general, MFA practice has done little to define the concept
of market disruption, which has generally been loosely
construed to justify additional restrictions. The MFA's
operation is primarily outlined in Articles 3 and 4 and
Annexes A and B.
Article 3 of the MFA allows an importing country to impose
unilaterally quantitative restrictions on particular imports if
the country determines that a state of market disruption exists
due to imports of a product from a particular nation. However,
these restrictions may only be applied if, after a 60-day period
of consultations, the exporting nation fails to remove the
disruption.9
Article 3 contemplates limits on the use of quota restric-
tions both through voluntary restraint on the part of the
importing nation and through consideration of the interests of
the exporting country,92 particularly if the exporter is a
s ZHENG, supra note 77, at 5-6.
8 Id, Annex A. The United States has interpreted Annex A such that
the importing country may determine which factors may be sufficient to
prove market disruption, assigning weight to those factors as it chooses.
ZHENG, supra note 77, at 18.
" ZHENG, supra note 77, at 22-23.
"1 MFA, supra note 8, art. 3. Under the MFA, a party which is subject
to an Article 3 action implicitly waives rights to compensatory or retaliatory
action that may be invoked in response to a GATT Article XIX action.
Article 3 actions have a duration of one year, but may be renewed upon
consultation and adjustment for growth rates.
"s MFA, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 2.
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developing country.93 On a more quantifiable level, quotas
may not be set below specific levels outlined in Annex B. 4
The floor levels outlined in Annex B provide some safeguards
for exporting countries against whom Article 3 action is taken.
In addition to the measures outlined in Article 3, the MFA
authorizes trading partners to enter into bilateral trade
agreements governing textile and apparel trade. Article 4 of
the MFA provides that participating parties may enter into
bilateral agreements to "eliminate the real risks of market
disruption ... in importing countries and disruption to the
textile trade of exporting countries, and ... to insure the
orderly development of trade in textiles."" Article 4 agree-
ments are the most commonly used safeguard measures in
international textile trade. 6 These agreements are contrary
to the concept of nondiscrimination under GATT, which
requires that trade terms must be the same for all trading
partners with respect to a particular good.9" Article 4 agree-
ments offer some benefits to their exporting nation signatories.
The agreements are subject to restrictions which specify
minimum base levels,9" growth rates,99 and flexibility"°
that are designed to provide a measure of stability, predictabil-
" Id Other provisions of the MFA specifically address the concerns of
less developed exporting countries, which include many Caribbean Basin
nations. Article 6 encourages importing countries to refrain from imposing
unnecessary restrictions on developing countries. Where restrictions are
necessary, Article 6 recommends that importing countries allow higher
growth rates and base levels for imports, and requires higher quotas and
growth rates for products already the subject of restrictions. MFA, supra
note 8, art. 6.
"' Id, Annex B.
'r MFA, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 2.
96 Henry R. Zheng, The Legal Structure of the International Textile Trade
and the July 1986 MFA Renewal Negotiations, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 285, 303
(1986).
s GATT, supra note 9, art. I.
9 MFA, supra note 8, Annex B, para. 1(a). Base levels may not be below
the actual volume level of imports during the previous twelve months. Id.
" Id. para. 2. Subject to certain exceptions, quota restrictions that
remain in effect for longer than one year must be increased at a rate of at
least six percent. Id.
100 Id. para. 5. Where more than one product has been restricted, the
agreed level for a product may be exceeded by 7 percent, or in exceptional
circumstances, 5 percent provided that the overall aggregate quota limit is
not exceeded. Underutilized quotas may also be carried forward. Id.
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ity and ordered growth in trade. Products covered by Article
4 agreements may not be the subject of Article 3 unilateral
restrictions by the importing party, although this advantage is
somewhat diminished in practice. Disparate bargaining power
between importing and exporting nations often leads to the
inclusion of antisurge or consultation clauses which allow
Article 3 type restrictions to be imposed by the importing
party.101
Also covered by the MFA are the type of operations that
have developed in the Caribbean under Sections 807 and 807A.
Article 6 has two provisions that directly refer to Section 807-
type outward processing operations. Paragraph 5 provides
that:
Participating countries shall not, as far as possible,
maintain restraints on trade in textile products origi-
nating in other participating countries which are
imported under a system of temporary importation for
re-export after processing, subject to a satisfactory
system of control and certification.1 °2
The operation of this paragraph would restrict an importer
of goods for processing, such as Jamaica, acting under 807
operations, from imposing restraint levels on those imports.
Paragraph 6 continues:
Consideration shall be given to special and differential
treatment to re-imports into a participating country of
textile products which that country has exported to
another participating country for processing and
subsequent re-importation, in the light of the special
nature of such trade without prejudice to the provisions
of Article 3.103
Worded in vaguer terminology than Paragraph 5, this para-
graph applies to the reimporter, the United States involved in
807 operations. Whereas the importing processor shall try to
limit quota restrictions, the exporter need only give consider-
ation to the re-imported processed goods. The stronger
recommendation for restraint is directed toward the weaker
101 ZHENG, supra note 77, at 34-37.
102 MFA, supra note 8, para. 5.
I &d para. 6.
19921
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
party, the processor, who is more dependent on the' trade,
while the vaguer recommendation is directed toward the re-
importer. Despite the explicit recommendations of Article 6,
the United States still subjects Section 807 apparel made from
non-United States fabric to quantitative restrictions under
Section 807A and the GALs.
Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the MFA are the backdrop against
which the Caribbean Basin apparel industry has developed.
Although the United States has taken a step away from the
MFA in eliminating quotas on Section 807 apparel imports
made from U.S. material under Section 807A, the overall
patterns and concepts of textile and apparel trade continue to
be governed by the MFA. The MFA's operation, in general,
causes trade diversion and, insasmuch [sic] as it
operates with bilateral quotas, works against the
exporting developing countries. Economic inefficiency
and sub-optimal resource allocation are built into the
MFA, which reduces imports of textiles and clothing
into the industrialized countries and indirectly reduces
the number of job openings in the export industries of
the latter.104
Exporters have often characterized the restriction placed on
them as unfair, arbitrary and based on slim factual findings of
injury." s Furthermore, these restrictions usually apply to
the exports of less developed and developing countries who
depend heavily on textile and apparel exports. The operation
of the MFA, rather than stabilizing and balancing textile and
apparel trade, has intensified existing trade restrictions and
has destroyed multilateral discipline in the sector."'
0 4 Dilip K. Das, Dismantling the Multifibre Arrangement?, 19 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 67, 68 (1985) (discussing a 1984 GATT report assessing the
operation of the MFA and its impact on the trade prospects of developing
countries).
'O5 Note, supra note 78, at 543.
1" ZHENG, supra note 77, at 1-2.
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4.2.2. The MFA and GAT
To understand the potential impact of the reintegration of
the MFA into GATT for Caribbean Basin apparel exporters, a
description of GATT and the differences between the MFA and
GATT is helpful.
In its most simple form, the GATT' contemplates the
elimination of all non-tariff barriers to trade, followed by
intermittent rounds of negotiations where member nations
attempt to reduce remaining tariff levels through reciprocal
agreements."' The use of quantitative restrictions on im-
ports or exports is generally prohibited under GATT Article 11,
although quotas may be used by a nation to protect its balance
of payments,"° national security, public health or morals,
and developing industries."'
In theory, all GATT contracting parties benefit from tariff
reductions negotiated between any two parties due to applica-
tion of the most-favored-nation principle ("MFN"). The most-
favored-nation principle is embodied in GATT Article ."
Most-favored-nation practice establishes the principle of
" The only legal basis for GATT in international trade is the Protocol
of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, which
adopts GATT Articles I, II, and III. Ninety-six nations, known as the
"contracting parties" are currently signatories of the Protocol. Major areas
of world trade not covered by GATT include the Middle East, where Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria are not signatories, and the Pacific,
where the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Burma and
the USSR are not signatories. Most of Eastern Europe is covered by the
GATT, with the exception of Albania and Bulgaria.
108 See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 115. Tariffs are preferred due to their
transparency-they are highly visible and their effects are more easily
quantifiable than less transparent trade restrictions such as quotas. Id at
116.
," See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, arts. XII-XV.
Id- arts. XX, XXI, and XVIII. In addition, customs procedures are
brought under a reasonableness standard, while governments are allowed
to retain freedom in their procurement decisions. Id. arts. VII-X.
Governments also retain the freedom to subsidize domestic economic
development. Id. art. XVIII.
"' GATT, supra note 9, art. I. In practice, MFN clauses may be either
conditional and unconditional, the difference lying in that conditional
clauses provide that the granting of benefits to a trading partner of benefits
negotiated with another partner may only occur if concessions are granted
to "pay" for those additional benefits. JACKSON, supra note 108, at 136-8.
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nondiscrimination, whereby each contracting party grants to
every other the most favorable treatment that it grants to any
country with respect to its imports and exports." 2 Nondis-
crimination also creates an obligation for an importing nation
to treat foreign goods equally to domestic goods after their
importation.'
The nondiscrimination principle established by GATT
contemplates a multilateral approach to international trade
management. In contrast, the bilateral agreements between
individual trading partners allowed under the MFA are a
major departure from the most-favored-nation principles and
multilateralism.
Several provisions in GATT address the concerns of
developing countries and allow for the differential treatment
of imports and exports from developing countries. Articles
XVIII and the articles in part IV of GATT allow governments
to aid infant industries and assist economic development, even
by restricting trade. Developing countries may also take
advantage of safeguard provisions and restrict trade due to
balance of payments problems."4 GATT does not otherwise
distinguish between trade of developing and developed
countries." 5
Historically, the less developed countries ("LDCs") have
argued that the operation of GATT disadvantages their
trade."6 Due to the lack of an effective enforcement mea-
sure under GATT, weaker countries have argued that they
have little recourse or bargaining power in situations where
stronger importing countries violate the letter or spirit of trade
agreements." Developing countries have also argued that
the GATT does not afford them the protection they require to
develop their "infant industries" to a level where they can
compete on an equal footing in world trade."'
In fact, the most-favored-nation principle and the
112 JACKSON, supra note 75, at 133.
1 Id,
114 See supra notes 109-10.
11  JACKSON, supra note 75, at 276.
11See D. TUSSIE, THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 2 (1987).
117 Id. at 2-3. See also JACKSON, supra note 75, at 276-7.
11 See TUSSIE, supra note 116, at 20.
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multilateralization of tariff concessions under GATT, resulting
in equal tariff treatment of all countries regardless of their
competitive position, place LDCs at a disadvantage in world
trade.' LDCs have attempted to reverse these perceived
disadvantages by pressuring for greater discretion to protect
domestic industries and for exemption from the tariff conces-
sion reciprocity requirements of GATT. On the export side,
their efforts have been directed at gaining preferential tariff
treatment for exports to the industrialized nations. 20
The MFA departs from GATT principles in three significant
areas. First, the MFA, unlike the GATT, legalizes quantita-
tive restrictions on imports. Second, the MFA allows discrimi-
natory treatment of imports on a nation-by-nation basis,
displacing the most-favored-nation trading principle. Third,
the MFA alters some of the rights of GATT signatories to
impose trade restrictions and to retaliate against them. 2'
One of the primary differences between the MFA and
GATT lies in the MFA's more liberal safeguard mechanisms.
Articles 3 and 4 of the MFA outline a standard on when
importing nations may withdraw tariff concessions or impose
quantitative restrictions that is less rigorous than the stan-
dard outlined in GATT Article XIX." Article 3 allows
"' Id. at 25. These concerns sector were a factor that led to the
development of the MFA during the 1960s and 1970s. See STEELE, supra
note 22, at 30-2.
120 TusslE, supra note 116, at 4. Other proposals have included the
elimination of illegal quotas on LDC exports and the elimination of internal
taxes which have the effect of discriminating against LDC exports in
importers' domestic markets. Id. at 27.
The success of the LDC's in this area is evident in the Generalized
System of Preferences ("GSP"). The GSP framework allows importing
nations to violate the nondiscrimination principle and the MFN clause of
GATT by lowering tariff rates to benefit and increase trade from developing
countries. The GSP was established in 1971 after a ten-year waiver from
the GATT MFN clause was granted. GATT, B.I.S.D. 18 Supp. 24 (1972).
Following its expiration in 1981, an official declaration at the Tokyo Round
entitled "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", GATT, B.I.S.D. 26 Supp. 203
(1980), became the "enabling clause" allowed for the GSP's continuation.
See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 279.
Many of the exports of the Caribbean have benefitted under the GSP
since its adoption by the United States. However, textiles and apparel are
not covered by the GSP.
"' See generally MFA, supra note 8, arts. 3 and 4.
122 ZHENG, supra note 77, at 103.
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unilateral action, following consultation, upon a showing of
"market disruption" as opposed to the showing of "serious
injury" required under GATT.
Although "market disruption" and "serious injury" remain
somewhat vague and ill-defined, they differ in the factors
which may be considered sufficient to establish their effects on
an importer's markets. A potential or imminent increase is
sufficient to establish market disruption, while an actual
increase in imports may be used to establish both market
disruption and serious injury."  Article 4 agreements,
which may be based solely on risks of increases, have no
counterpart under GATT.
The market disruption standard is also less stringent in
that the increase in imports may be due to the usual course of
economic development, including changes in fashion or
consumer preferences. To establish serious injury under
GATT, the increase must be the result of unforeseen develop-
ments.' Consideration of the price differentials between
imports and domestics is also permitted to establish market
disruption, but not serious injury.
125
An exporter has different initial recourse from an Article
3 action than from a safeguard action under GATT Article XIX.
Under the MFA, the exporting nation implicitly waives all
rights to compensatory or retaliatory responses that would be
allowed under GATT Article XIX.126 Under GATT, a party
subject to Article XIX restrictions may take "compensation" by
suspending equivalent concessions or other GATT obligations.
However, the MFA preserves a party's GATT rights to appeal
to the TSB and the GATT Council under Article XXIH.
127
The MFA safeguard provisions further differ from those
available under GATT in that they allow bilateral agreements
that conflict with the GATT principles of nondiscrimination
and most-favored-nation type multilateralism. These agree-
ments allow the negotiation of quotas and the establishment
of base levels, growth rates and flexibility in their implementa-
123 Id. at 104.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See supra text accompanying note 90.
127 MFA, supra note 8, art. 11, paras. 9-10.
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tion.1 ' GATT allows the use of quotas only in limited cir-
cumstances: where there is serious injury under Article XIX,
where necessary to maintain the balance of payments under
Article XII, or to protect national security, public health and
safety, or developing industries under Articles XX, XXI, and
XVIII.
There are several important differences between MFA
quotas and GATT quotas. Quotas implemented through GATT
safeguards have no base level or growth rate requirements
analogous to those required under the MFA. More significant-
ly, GATT quotas are nondiscriminatory. For example, a
quantitative restriction imposed under GATT Article XIX
would set a cap on aggregate imports rather than on imports
from one particular country. This is known as a global quota.
MFA quotas restrict quantities of products on a country-by-
country basis.
In theory, upon elimination of the GATT and reintegration
of textile and apparel trade into the MFA, all barriers to trade,
except tariffs, would be eliminated. Safeguard measures
imposing quotas or increasing tariffs would be implemented
under strengthened GATT disciplines, and there would be no
market disruption. The flow of international textile trade
would be shaped by the application of the nondiscrimination
principle and the most-favored-nation clause instead of
bilateral agreements. The prospect of these changes poses
serious challenges to the present structure of Caribbean Basin
apparel and textile trade and the future of the region's apparel
assembly industry.
4.3. Phasing Out the MFA: Caribbean Interests and the
Chairman's Text
4.3.1. The U.S. Proposals
The differences between MFA quotas and global quotas
have recently taken on heightened importance for Caribbean
Basin textile exporters. The establishment of a global quota
transition mechanism is one of several proposals that has been
put forward during ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations to
... See supra notes 98-100.
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develop a phaseout mechanism for the MFA."' Such a
phaseout would eliminate the differences outlined above
between the MFA and GATT and bring trade in textile and
apparel in line with GATT principles. The terms and timing
of the transition mechanism ultimately adopted will have
important effects on Caribbean Basin textile and apparel
trade.
Eliminating the MFA and bringing textile and apparel
trade under GATT would:
reduce production in the clothing industry in the
industrialized countries, while in textiles both country
groups would follow their comparative advantage more
closely . . . Among developing countries there would
be a redistribution of clothing and textiles production,
which would be determined more by the cost factors,
and developing countries would be able to import more
from the industrialized countries. Bringing trade under
the liberal concepts of the GATT would mean that
tariffs would be brought down and Article XIX observed
to see that there is no excessive damage to the domestic
industry of the importers. It would include trade
liberalization with elimination of discrimination, and
the most-favored nation clause would come into force
again.
3 0
There is evidence to suggest that the first of these effects, the
reduction of production in the industrialized, importing
nations, may be different in the textile sector than in the
apparel sector. Capital intensive technology and automation
in industrialized nations has increased productivity in the
textiles sector so as to counter the low wage advantages in
developing countries.' In apparel, developing countries are
likely to have a more significant competitive advantage than
in textiles, due to the low level of technology required for
apparel assembly and the highly labor-intensive nature of
production. Consequently, if quotas were removed and the
MFA eliminated, the apparel assembly industries of Caribbean
... See GATT Document MTN.GNG/NG4/W/37.
13 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67 (1989).
131 Id. at 76.
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exporters might post gains at the expense of importing nations'
assembly industries, while the textile industries in developed
countries are unlikely to experience significant damage or
declines in employment. These changes would be felt not only
in the United States, but also in other importing nations that
have erected trade barriers to Caribbean exports.'32
Although the MFA allows importers more freedom to
restrict trade than GATT, one benefit of MFA Article 4
agreements and the Section 807A program for Caribbean
exporters has been guaranteed access. In fact, this nation-by-
nation approach to quotas has allowed Caribbean countries to
gain privileged access to United States markets. Following a
shift to a global-quota system under GATT, Caribbean
exporters' access to the United States market would no longer
be guaranteed.
The return of textile and apparel trade to a regime
governed by nondiscrimination and the most-favored-nation
principle would expose Caribbean suppliers to greater competi-
tion from other sources, such as the Far East and Asia.
Although the demise of bilateral Article 4-type agreements
could open up new markets for Caribbean exporters, Caribbean
exporters could suffer from increased competition among
themselves and with other sourcing regions.
The concern over heightened competition gives rise to a
question of timing and duration of the MFA phaseout. The
longer the transition period, the more time the Caribbean
Basin textile industry will have to prepare for increased
competition from other international textile suppliers. The
type of transition mechanism is also important. A mechanism
that allows adaptation without too much disruption would be
ideal.
In communications to the Uruguay Round Negotiating
Group on Textiles and Clothing, the United States put forth
three general requirements, and several different proposals,
for the successful integration of the MFA into GATT. The
requirements include the following:
(1) ensure that all relevant trade measures affecting
" Id. at 80 (citing a U.S. Department of Labor study estimating minimal
production and employment declines in the domestic textile industry
following trade liberalization).
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trade in textiles and clothing are integrated; (2) ensure
that GATT rules and disciplines have been sufficiently
strengthened to make integration viable... (3) provide
for a process that will ensure an orderly transition from
measures being applied following the end of the Uru-
guay Round to those which will be applicable when this
sector is fully integrated into the GATT. 33
To promote the achievement of these goals, the United
States submitted the following proposals for transitionary
mechanisms:"M (a) the continuation of the MFA structure
with gradual phaseouts of quotas and tariffs; (b) the establish-
ment of a global quota system; and (c) the establishment of a
tariff-rate quota system." 5 The reintegration process would
be completed over a period of ten years.
A focus on the global quota proposal is helpful for two
reasons. First, the United States favored the global quota
throughout the early stages of negotiations. Second, the
Caribbean response to the perceived impact of a global quota
is helpful to understanding their overall concerns regarding
the MFA's reintegration with GATT.l"6
Under the global quota approach, textile trade would no
longer be governed by the quotas negotiated under MFA
bilateral agreements. Instead, global quotas would be
established setting annual ceilings for total imports regardless
of the country of origin. Present quotas would be a starting
point for initial quota base levels, while nations without
existing quotas would compete with others out of a global
"basket." The transition to global quotas vould be achieved
over a period of ten years by annually reallocating 10 percent
' Communication from the United States, March 2, 1990, at 2.
1 4See GATT Document MTN.GNG/NG4/W/37. See also William R. Cline
Executive Summary, Textile and Apparel Negotiations in the Uruguay
Round, Mar. 1990.
" A tariff-rate quota system would end absolute quantitative restric-
tions on imports, replacing them with duty surcharges that would effectively
limit imports to a certain level. These surcharges are phased down over
time, effectively reducing or eliminating the original quantitative restric-
tions.
13 Under Article XIX safeguard actions, a global quota is established.
Current import quotas under the MFA are established on a nation-by-nation
basis. In theory, replacement of the MFA's discriminatory quotas with
global quotas will eventually occur upon the MFA's reintegration into GATT.
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of the country-specific quotas to the global basket until a
general-source regime is established. 7
The implementation of the global quota would be accompa-
nied by the integration of all trade distorting measures not
currently within GATT based on strengthened GATT rules and
disciplines.' Product coverage under the transition propos-
al would attempt to consolidate or eliminate quota categories.
4.3.2. The Caribbean Response
The reaction of large Caribbean apparel exporters to the
United States' global quota proposal and to the absence of firm
guarantees for Section 807 and 807A trade was negative. (The
United States proposal originally indicated only that Section
807 and 807A trade could possibly be exempted from the
transition mechanism.) The United States global quota
proposal would have effectively eliminated the favorable access
enjoyed by Caribbean Basin exporters under Section 807A. 39
Unrestrained competition from low wage producers from
the Far East could have a large, negative impact on Caribbean
apparel exporters. An abrupt dismantling of the MFA could
leave Caribbean Basin apparel assemblers exposed to a high
degree of price competition from the Far East before any
improvements in their ability to compete could be implement-
ed. Caribbean nations argue that sufficient time is needed to
allow for adaptation of the industry to the export market that
would probably be a result of the MFA phaseout, which would
be driven more by price factors than by access factors."
"3 See Communication from the United States, March 2, 1990. See also
Cline, supra note 134, at 3-5.
13 Statement by the United States Delegation at the Meeting of the
Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing, 21 September 1989, GATT
MTN.GNG/NG4/W/26, September 21, 1989. The development of more
effectively enforced and strengthened measures is a significant concern of
the developing countries with respect to post-MFA trade. Although GAIT
reflects a more demanding legal discipline of importers than the MFA, the
practice of many developing countries which impose illegal trade barriers
has promoted demands from LDC's for stronger discipline if the protection
of the MFA is permanently eliminated. R. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 134-5 (1987).
1 Summary Report of Discussions at a Meeting of the CBI Apparel
Group, June 25th 1990.
140 Id.
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On April 24, 1990, CBI delegates met with U.S. Chief
Textile Negotiator, Ambassador Ron Sorini, at Kingston,
Jamaica to outline their reaction to the United States'
proposals. 4" Jamaican representatives noted that none of
the United States' options would preserve or protect Jamaica's
apparel export trade. The representatives felt that the
phrasing of the 807A exemption was particularly vague,
creating uncertainty both for the Jamaican private sector
customers in the United States, and for 25,000 domestic 807A
workers whose products constitute 23 percent of Jamaica's
exports."
Delegates also listed the vagueness of the ten percent per
annum reallocation of country specific quotas as a source of
concern.' The proposed reductions raised the possibility of
increased competition from low-cost Asian producers such as
the People's Republic of China and India before Caribbean
Basin industries might become more competitive. The method
of quota reallocation is considered extremely important by
Jamaican negotiators. The auctioning of quota allocations to
United States buyers, or a "first to the dock" system by which
global quotas are filled on a first-come basis, were both felt to
be unsatisfactory, leaving Caribbean Basin exporters at the
whim of United States buyers and exposed to competitive
domination from the Far East."
During the April meeting, Ambassador Sorini clarified the
United States' position of continued support for the Caribbean
Basin apparel industry. The United States' negotiating
position would be to exempt outward processing operations
under Section 807A from the proposed global quotas. Such
trade would also be exempt from the annual ten percent
reduction."
141 Representatives at the meeting included delegates from Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles,
and Trinidad and Tobago, the CARICOM Secretariat and several exporter
lobby associations.
142 Press Statement outlining the Discussion between U.S. Chief Textile
Negotiator, Ambassador Ron Sorini and C.B.I. Delegates Meeting in
Kingston on April 24, 1990.
143 Id.
144 i&
145 Press Statement, Apr. 24, 1990.
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4.2.3. The Chairman's Text
Despite this shift in the official United States position,
other negotiating parties have not yet assented to proposals to
protect Section 807 and 807A trade. The ultimate effect on
Caribbean textile and apparel exporters is uncertain at this
time due to the lack of clarity of the most current draft of the
MFA phaseout agreement ("the Chairman's Text" or the
"Draft").'" Furthermore, significant uncertainty remains in
the specifics and timing of the transition mechanism.
The current draft of the MFA phaseout agreement reflects
a rejection of the United States global quota approach.
Instead, the transition will be based on the integration of the
MFA into GATT through the gradual elimination of quantita-
tive restrictions. Although the exact schedule and timing of
the transition remains undecided, the agreement contemplates
three stages during which quota restraint levels will increase
on an annual basis to allow increased importation. 47 Dur-
ing the transition period, all flexibility provisions, such as
swing, will continue as those in 1991 MFA bilateral agree-
ments."'8
The Chairman's Text consists of eleven articles and four
annexes. A detailed discussion of each of these is beyond the
scope of this Comment. In brief, Articles 1, 2 and 3 discuss
the integration of MFA and non-MFA restrictions on textiles
into GATT. Articles 4, 5 and 7 deal with the administration of
the transition mechanisms and the prohibition of fraud or
other circumventions of the arrangement. Article 9 contains
provisions for monitoring, surveillance, review and dispute
settlement. Articles 10 and 11 concern the currently unspeci-
fied time span and the proposed January 1, 1992 starting date
for the implementation of the transition mechanism. The
annexes list the product coverage of the agreement and specific
, Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing, Chairman's Text, GATT
MTN.GNG/NG4/W/68, Nov. 19, 1990.
147 Id. at art. 2 para. 10. The current draft indicates that Stage 1 annual
growth rates will increase at 16 percent, Stage 2 at 21 percent, and Stage
3 at 26 percent. However these numbers have not yet been agreed upon.
Id. at parts i-iil.
148 I& at art. 2, para. 11. The draft also contains a proposal allowing the
renegotiation of base levels, growth rates and flexibility which has not been
approved. Id. at para. 12.
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actions to be taken when the agreement enters into force.
Article 6 outlines the safeguard mechanism during the
transitional period. Although the exact terminology used
differs from GATT Article XIX, the safeguard mechanism is
closer to GATT standards than to MFA standards. Although
safeguard actions may still be invoked on a country-by-country
basis, there are several important elements that create a
transitionary standard more restrictive than MFA "market
disruption." Within the transitionary framework, safeguard
action may only be undertaken when a party determines and
demonstrates that "a particular product is being imported into
its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing like and/or directly competitive products." (Empha-
sis added).4
The serious damage standard narrows the existing MFA
standard by requiring a sharp and substantial increase in
imports. Safeguard action can still be imposed upon a showing
of an imminent increase in imports, but in more defined and
limited circumstances than under the MFA market disruption
standard. The increase must be measurable and "shall not be
determined to exist on the basis of allegation, conjecture or
mere possibility arising, for example, from the existence of
production capacity in the exporting countries."150 This
stronger standard could help end perceived abuses practiced
by importing countries at exporting countries' expense by
requiring a higher threshold for the imposition of restrictive
trade measures.
Provisions in the Draft specifically address the problems of
less developed countries. Article 2 contains an uplift clause to
provide "meaningful improvement in access" for small export-
ers to large markets by raising base levels or growth
rates. 5' Less developed countries are to be accorded treat-
ment significantly more favorable in the application of
safeguard measures. 5 Growth and flexibility rates for new
entrants must take account of the need to further their
148 Chairman's Text, supra note 146, art.6, para. 2.
150 Id. at art. 6, para. 4, n. 2.
151 Id- at art. 2, para. 14.
1. Id. at art. 6, para. 6(a).
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economic development."' Small exporters are also accorded
some favorable treatment in setting quota levels, and poten-
tially, growth rates and flexibility.'" Additionally, all
handloom products or traditional folklore handicraft textile
products are to be integrated directly into GATT. 5 '
The Chairman's Draft also contains proposals presented by
the United States that specifically address 807-type outward
processing trade. The current state of the draft indicates
uncertainty surrounding the treatment of this type of trade
under the transition agreement. Article 2, paragraph 5(f)
discusses this area:
[More favourable treatment shall be accorded to]
[Transitional safeguard shall not be applied to]
reimports into a country of textile products which that
party has exported to another party for processing and
subsequent reimportation, as defined by the laws and
practices of the importing parties, and subject to
satisfactory control and certification procedures, when
these products are imported from a party for which this
type of trade represents a significant proportion of its
total exports of textiles and clothing.]'5 6
As the draft suggests, it is unclear whether 807 operations
will be exempted or merely treated more favorably during the
transition period.
15 7
The Draft also contains a bracketed proposal for the
complete elimination of United States quotas on the re-imports
on 807 and 807A products. Annex III provides that practices
to be immediately eliminated when the agreement takes force
include:
Restrictions on re-imports into a party's territory of
textile products which that party has exported to
15 Id at para. 6(b).
154 Id. at para. 6(c).
15 Id. at annex III, § A, para. 2.
15 Id at art. 6, para. 5(f).
167 Phrases which are bracketed in the Chairman's Draft have not yet
been agreed upon by the negotiating parties. The provisions as presently
described are likely to be changed, modified or excised from the agreement
prior to its conclusion.
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another party's territory for processing, including
restrictions described as "special regime", "guaranteed
access level", "outward processing trade" quotas,
imports under TSUSA 807 and 807 A and other similar
restrictions.15
The clause could immediately benefit Caribbean apparel
exporters by eliminating restrictions on 807 as well as 807A
import levels, but the bracketed status of the clause leaves its
prospects for survival uncertain.
Despite the inclusion of these provisions which specifically
address the interests of Caribbean nations, considerable
uncertainty remains. The lack of detail concerning the exact
manner of implementation of the transition mechanisms 5
and the safeguard mechanisms which will apply both during
and after the transition to GATT make it difficult to assess
and predict the outcome of the phaseout negotiations. One
risk of adopting the MFA transitionary approach is that the
existing structure of textile trade will not be altered for a
considerable time. Although the duration of the transition
period remains undecided and the United States has proposed
the phaseout of all restrictions by 2002, less developed
countries have expressed concern over this scenario.'
LDCs are concerned over Article 9 of the Draft, which provides
for review of market access obligations and compliance with
strengthened rules and disciplines before proceeding to the
next transitionary stage.' 1 The LDCs fear that the review
mechanism could be used to stall and delay the integration
process indefinitely."2
However, under such a scenario, Caribbean apparel
exporters could benefit due to the continuation of their current
preferential access and tariff treatment, provided that the
phaseout agreement provides for their continuation. Although
it is unclear whether such provision will be made, it is unlikely
that the United States will easily change the status of the
15 Chairman's Text, supra note 146, annex III, § C, para. 3.
159 See supra note 156'and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Textile Chairman says Nov. 16 is Final Deadline for
Reaching Draft Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 7, 1990.
'6'IdM at art. 9.
162 !d.
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Caribbean industries as suppliers of assembly and finishing
services to domestic textile producers.1"
The policies and mechanisms which result from the
negotiations to integrate the MFA into GATT will shape the
future of the Caribbean Basin textile industry. The extent to
which 807 and 807A trade is excluded from the transition
mechanism and excluded from import quota restrictions, the
duration of the phaseout, and the scope of the safeguards
available to importers will certainly affect the contours of the
Caribbean Basin apparel industry's continued growth. But
with the Uruguay Round stalled, the region's exporters can do
little but press their agenda and wait.
5. CONCLUSION
Under the operation of Section 807, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the Section 807A special access program, the
apparel assembly industry has become the region's largest
exporter. However, this industry remains highly dependent
upon reduced tariffs and preferential access which give the
industry a competitive edge over other world suppliers to the
United States apparel market.
This dependency could harm Caribbean Basin apparel
assemblers in the future. Free trade agreements and bilateral
discussions underway with other United States trading
partners could render the region's preferential access and duty
reductions meaningless. Most notably, a free trade agreement
with Mexico could draw future investment away from the
Caribbean Basin unless Caribbean nations are included in the
agreement or other action is taken to equalize their relative
positions.
The greatest change in the Caribbean Basin textile and
apparel industry is likely to result from the transition
agreement for the reintegration of the MFA into GATT. The
elimination of the MFA will ultimately reshape the current
structure of the international textile trade, replacing bilateral-
ism with the operation of the most-favored nation-clause and
the nondiscrimination principle.
The present Chairman's Draft of the phaseout agreement
reflects a state of disagreement among the negotiating parties
13 See STEELE, supra note 22, at 4.
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concerning the future of Section 807 and 807A trade. Consid-
erable uncertainty remains as to duration and exact mecha-
nism of the transition agreement and the ultimate effect these
will have on Caribbean Basin textile trade.
For the present, United States textile and apparel trade
policy in the Caribbean will remain significantly unchanged.
With the failure of CBI II's attempt to expand duty-free
treatment, non-807 apparel and textile operations will not
benefit from Section 807's narrowly tailored tariff reductions.
Accordingly, the textile and apparel industries in the Caribbe-
an Basin are likely to continue in the pattern of development
established by Sections 807 and 807A, with continued empha-
sis on apparel assembly and the use of United States fabrics.
While in the long-run a transition to GATT and the
abolition of quotas could benefit 807 operations using foreign
fabrics which fall outside Section 807A, such a change likely
will not occur in the short term. The failure of CBI II to enact
a foreign fabric short supply provision and the United States'
unwillingness to extend generous quota allowances beyond 807
operations that use United States fabric reflect a stalemate in
future expansion of current programs which benefit Caribbean
exporters. While the transition from the MFA to GATT could
potentially eliminate remaining quotas on textile and apparel
imports from the Caribbean, the timing and terms of the
transition remain unclear.
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